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Trade and Investment |
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| Over the past ten years
there has been an explosion of regional trade agreements and bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) designed to afford protection to foreign investors and their
investments. Likewise, during the last decade, foreign investors have increasingly
used investor-to-state dispute settlement to sue host state for damages
before unaccountable arbitral tribunals. Many stakeholders are apprehensive
about investment rules and arbitration, including environmental groups,
labor groups, development organizations, local governments, and more. These
concerns stem from the ambiguous or unbalanced character of the rules governing
investments, as well as from the democratic deficits apparent in the arbitral
mechanism utilized to resolve investment disputes. Please visit CIEL's web
page regarding concerns on governance,
development, and environment for further information. As currently designed, BITs and other investment agreements are frustrating the transition towards sustainable development. In many cases, investors have aggressively used investment rules to gain compensation at the expense of local environmental, safety, and human rights laws, rendering local democratic institutions unable to protect their citizens from the negative impacts of unsustainable investments. This ability to run roughshod over important local laws is one of the main reasons CIEL is concerned about the investment provisions found in many treaties today. CIEL and many other civil society organizations feel that the far- reaching rights enjoyed by transnational corporations should be reigned in and balanced by rules and specific obligations to encourage better environmental and human rights practices. International agreements for the protection of investments are proliferating
at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. A couple initiatives to
further expand investment protections have failed, however. For example,
in 1998 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
attempted to negotiate a comprehensive charter of corporate privileges
behind closed doors, but failed after a global civil society campaign.
More recently in 2003, the European Communities and others attempted to
further expand the World Trade Organization (WTO) to encompass investment,
but failed due to the opposition of developing countries and organized
civil society. See more about our work with the WTO below. Despite its apparent democratic deficits, the NAFTA model has been replicated in a number of other, more recent bilateral free trade agreements, including the U.S.-Singapore, U.S.-Chile, Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and others. Similar provisions can be found in the Energy Charter Treaty and in the over two thousand BITs in force worldwide. Since the 1990's alone, over 1800 BITs have been negotiated. The United States has recently revised its model BIT, incorporating minor changes to the rules, in order to constrain extensive interpretations. These changes are welcome but remain insufficient. Please see comments on the draft model BIT submitted by CIEL and other groups. The international legal framework on investment law not only includes
treaties but also contracts between host states and foreign investors,
referred to as host government agreements (HGAs) or State contracts. One
example of a host government agreement is the agreement negotiated for
the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline Project. CIEL is particularly concerned
with the legal, environmental, and social ramifications of the proposed
pipeline project, as the project's legal regime is an example of a trend
in investment liberalization and protection that undermines democratic
structures of governance and the rule of law.
For additional information, please contact Marcos Orellana.
This page last modified on 16 Feburary 2005 |
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