Drafting an acceptable compliance regime for the Kyoto Protocol was one of the most difficult issues faced by international negotiators last year as they worked to finalize implementation rules for the pact both in Bonn and Marrakech. Yet while the accord did not settle whether there will be “legally binding” consequences for so-called Annex I nations–that is, developed countries–failing to live up to their commitments, the Kyoto Protocol includes acompliance system that is both robust and novel. Unlike other multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), the protocol sets up both the procedures and institutions needed to gauge and enforce compliance, including a body that functions much like a court. It also includes real consequences for nations failing to meet their Kyoto obligations.
In fact, the protocol’s compliance system includes many procedures found in trade agreements governed by World Trade Organization rules. Most MEAs, on the other hand, have far weaker compliance systems, often relying only on unenforceable reporting requirements or ad hoc procedures. Representatives from more than 170 countries meeting in Marrakech, Morocco, Nov. 10 finalized the rules for implementing the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) after nearly five years of negotiations.
The protocol for the first time will create binding emissions targets for developed countries covering six greenhouse gases (GHGs): carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. The pact calls on industrialized nations to reduce their GHG emissions collectively by 5.2 percent–based on 1990 levels–between 2008-2012. Although the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush rejected U.S. participation in the protocol, key governments–including Japan, Russia, and the European Union–have announced their intention to ratify the agreement, which greatly enhances the likelihood that the treaty and its compliance system will soon carry the force of law.