September 22, 2003
When it was created 10 years ago, the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP) was an innovative mechanism
for accountability and governance. Most importantly, the panel provides a means for ensuring that World Bank policies and procedures are implemented by addressing the concerns of people who might be affected by Bank projects — particularly communities and individuals who simultaneously are among the ostensible beneficiaries of Bank-funded projects and at the same time are often vulnerable and politically marginalized groups who may otherwise not be heard in development discussions. The need for this is as strong now as it was 10 years ago. Although my organization and other elements of civil society have sometimes been critical of the Inspection Panel, it is important to recognize that the Panel has become remarkably effective in promoting accountability and has earned considerable credibility, both for itself and for the World Bank as a whole. It has done this directly through its investigations of specific Bank projects and also by being a credible “court of last resort” whose existence has stimulated Bank staff and government officials to pay more heed to Bank policies in order to avoid having a Panel investigation. The Panel has been effective indirectly by being an example to other institutions:
- all regional development banks except the African Development Bank have some sort of accountability mechanism modeled on-and sometimes improving on-the World Bank Inspection Panel;
- at least two export credit agencies ECAs, those of Canada and Japan, now have accountability mechanisms; and
- the IFC and MIGA have the office of the Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman, a similar type of accountability mechanism.
These mechanisms re-enforce the basic premise that development institutions should be accountable to directly affected people.
This progress was not inevitable, nor is it inevitable that it will be maintained. The panel has achieved credibility partly because of the structured independence built into its mandate. For example, the panel reports directly to the Board; and its reports are made public. In addition, the panel is a standing body, it maintains confidentiality when requested to, and its members have embodied the principles of independence, professionalism and transparency. Transparency and accessibility were also promoted by civil society. For example, the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) published a Citizen’s Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel in English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. Both the Bank and civil society must continue to focus on the Panel and the challenges confronting it, in order to maintain the gains already made, and to further improve the Panel’s effectiveness.
The Panel faces several significant challenges, some of which are evident in the Chad-Cameroon experience. For example, my organization recently was part of a workshop of claimants to look retrospectively at their experiences. The workshop and the resulting book – Demanding Accountability, edited by Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox and Kay Treakle, suggest several important conclusions:
- Claimants were almost always happy that they had sought the Panel’s assistance; most would do it again; and most thought the Panel treated them with respect and objectivity.
- Most claimants said their situation had improved on the ground immediately after their claims were filed, as attention from media, bank staff and government officials focused on them.
- Equally important, however, most (though not all) claimants reported that the situation deteriorated again assoon as the Panel process was over.
This strongly suggests that the Panel process should include monitoring and follow-up.
Another challenge evident from the Chad-Cameroon investigation is that the Panel was not able to address the full range of the claimants’ human rights concerns. This was not because of the Panel’s mandate, per se, but rather because there apparently is a view that the Bank itself is not subject to human rights norms. As a professor and practitioner of international law, I find that position to be baffling, particularly with respect to fundamental human rights, which are generally viewed as peremptory norms that cannot be changed by treaty. Even more generally, the notions that nation states can avoid their human rights responsibilities by acting
collectively through an international organization, or that an organization with the practical and moral significance of the World Bank can ignore the human rights regime are intolerable in today’s world.
Three other challenges deserve mention.
First, the reformulation of the Bank’s safeguard policies over the past several years has removed some mandatory language and made them more general. This is true, for example, of the Bank’s environmental, resettlement and forest policies. This must not be allowed to have the effect of eviscerating the Panel’s ability to apply those policies.
Second, the shift in Bank lending from specific projects to sectoral and structural adjustment loans raises concerns about the Bank’s accountability. Although such loans may not exactly fit project-oriented safeguard policies, they must be subject to appropriate policies and review by the Panel.
Third, there has been a tendency recently to increase the emphasis on the responsibility of borrower countries to comply with Bank policies. Though it is perfectly appropriate to insist the borrower countries adhere to Bank policies and to work to strengthen the capacity of Borrowers to meet the Bank’s expectations, this shift of responsibility to the Borrower raises concerns because it could be used to relieve the Bank of responsibility and insulate it from accountability. Experience has amply demonstrated that responsibility and accountability are essential at all levels, including the Bank. The Panel’s activities must reflect that reality.
Thank you.
Daniel B. Magraw, Jr.
President, Center for International Environmental Law