The negotiations to establish a mechanism such as a regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) in the Western and Central Pacific are based upon a shared understanding that an effective cooperative mechanism is needed to ensure the long term health and productivity of the region’s highly migratory fish stocks. One of the critical tasks facing negotiators is to define the procedures by which the new mechanism will make decisions, once its general framework and basic principles are established. These procedures must enable effective cooperation among participants, including the timely establishment of catch levels, quotas and other measures that effectively protect stocks in light of the best available scientific evidence and the precautionary approach. To help negotiators with this important question, this white paper reviews decision-making mechanisms drawn from the state of the art in international law and institutions. Our examination of RFMOs and other regimes and institutions reveals that a diverse array of mechanisms has been developed to enhance the effectiveness of decision-making.
Options range from strict consensus on one end of the spectrum, through consensus/supermajority voting combinations with “opt-in” or “opt-out” provisions, to various supermajority, multiple majority or simple majority voting mechanisms with no provisions for opting in or out at the other end of the spectrum. The most flexible of these latter options may be the framework-then-details or “prolepsis” approach used in the Montreal Protocol, discussed in this paper.